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Abstract—Nodes in route-restricted overlays have an im-
mutable set of neighbors, explicitly specified by their users. Pop-
ular examples include payment networks such as the Lightning
network as well as social overlays such as the Dark Freenet.
Routing algorithms are central to such overlays as they enable
communication between nodes that are not directly connected.
Recent results show that algorithms based on spanning trees
are the most promising provably efficient choice. However, all
suggested solutions fail to address how distributed spanning tree
algorithms can deal with active denial of service attacks by
malicious nodes.
In this work, we design a novel self-stabilizing spanning tree
construction algorithm that utilizes cryptographic signatures and
prove that it reduces the set of nodes affected by active attacks.
Our simulations substantiate this theoretical result with concrete
values based on real-world data sets. In particular, our results
indicate that our algorithm reduces the number of affected
nodes by up to 74% compared to state-of-the-art attack-resistant
spanning tree constructions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Payment or state channel networks like Lightning [13] are
the most promising approach to scaling blockchains, i.e.,
enabling blockchain-based payment systems to process tens
of thousands of transactions per second with nearly instant
confirmation. Participants in such payment networks establish
channels for trading assets such as digital coins. As estab-
lishing channels requires use of the blockchain, which is both
time- and cost-intensive, only nodes that frequently trade with
each other establish payment channels [6]. All other payments
pass from a sender to the receiver via multi-hop paths of
channels. It is essential to find these paths in an effective,
efficient, and privacy-preserving manner [16].
Similarly, social overlays require finding paths from a
peer to another in a network consisting only of connections
between trusted pairs of nodes to realize scalable and privacy-
preserving distributed services [3], [15].
Both payment channel networks and social overlays hence
share the need for a routing algorithm. A number of promising
algorithms for both networks rely on Breadth-First-Search
(BFS) spanning trees [11], [15], [16], as these permit finding
shortest paths and achieve the most efficient communication.
The underlying spanning tree construction algorithm deter-
mines the effectiveness, efficiency, and attack resilience of
the routing. Resistance to attacks by malicious parties who
aim to prevent the tree construction from converging towards
a correct spanning tree is particularly important. Preventing
the construction of a correct spanning tree results in routing
failures and hence constitutes a denial-of-service attack that
undermines communication. Such attacks are realistic for both
payment channel networks and social overlays. For payment
channel networks, adversarial parties may undermine the
routing of payments to sabotage competing operators. Social
overlays such as Freenet aim to protect communication from
censorship [3]. They clearly require attack resistance against
participants aiming to execute censorship in the form of a
denial-of-service attack.
In the context of route-restricted overlays with potentially
malicious participants, spanning tree algorithms have to fulfill
three requirements: (1) enable efficient communication by
providing short paths between honest nodes in the spanning
tree, (2) efficiently adapt to changes of the network structure,
and (3) maintain high availability in the presence of malicious
nodes that deliberately deviate from the construction protocol
in order keep the network from converging. Yet, the existing
work on spanning tree-based routing only evaluates the first
two aspects jointly, leaving protection against malicious be-
havior out of scope despite the likely existence of malicious
parties in both payment channel networks and social overlays.
In this work, we focus on achieving all three requirements
jointly, giving rise to two key contributions:
• We present a self-stabilizing algorithm for the compu-
tation of a BFS spanning tree that uses cryptographic
signatures to check the integrity of statements about the
distance to the root node. We prove that the fraction of
nodes reaching a stable, non-compromised state is higher
than in state-of-the-art protocols.
• We present results from an extensive simulation study
based on real-world data sets. The results demonstrate
that the construction of BFS spanning trees without cryp-
tographic measures is highly vulnerable to attacks, even
if the adversary establishes just a handful of connections
to honest nodes. Furthermore, we show that our algorithm
substantially raises the necessary number of such attack
connections to mislead a comparable number of nodes.
II. RELATED WORK
We review the existing work for routing in route-restricted
overlays to show that the design of attack-resistant spanning
trees is indeed the key problem to solve. Afterwards, we
consider the existing work on attack-resistant spanning tree
constructions, which we then improve upon in the following
sections.
A. Routing in route-restricted overlays
We define an overlay network, or just overlay, as a network
between multiple logically connected nodes that communicate
via a public infrastructure such as the Internet. In route-
restricted overlays, the logical connections between nodes
are explicitly managed by their respective users and hard or
even impossible to adapt to create a topology that benefits
routing. Apart from finding existing paths between nodes,
routing algorithms have to be efficient and scalable with
regard to delays for the delivery of messages, bandwidth and
memory consumption to provide adequate service for large-
scale peer-to-peer networks such as payment channel networks
and social overlays. Recent work [11], [15], [16] underlines
that only routing algorithms based on rooted spanning trees
provide the necessary efficiency. Other approaches either use
expensive flooding for path discovery [10] or setup virtual
tunnels [12], [14], [21], which, in face of network dynamics,
require costly maintenance [17]. Alternatively, some payment
channel networks of smaller size use source routing [13], [18],
which requires that each node maintains a snapshot of the
entire network. Source routing hence does not scale, as any
change to the network has to be broadcast.
In the context of social overlays, Hoefer et al. [8] suggested
using greedy embeddings based on rooted spanning trees to
enable efficient routing between nodes. The approach has
later been extended to preserve the privacy of users and offer
higher attack resistance [15]. However, their adversarial model
only considers the routing and not the construction of the
underlying spanning tree, which is an orthogonal approach
to the one taken in this paper.
For payment channel networks, Malavolta et al. [11] adapted
Landmark Routing [19], where a path between sender and
receiver is determined through an intermediate node via the
construction of a breadth-first-search tree rooted at the latter.
Roos et al. later on adapted the greedy embeddings to payment
channel networks [16]. Both works aim to achieve efficiency
and privacy and do not consider security.
It thus remains an open question, if and how such spanning
trees can be constructed in route-restricted overlays with
malicious participants.
B. Attack-resistant spanning tree construction
In the context of self-stabilization, Dubois, Masuzawa, and
Tixeuil proposed a BFS spanning tree algorithm and proved
that this algorithm guarantees that all nodes, except those that
are strictly closer to the adversary than to the root node,
will eventually converge to a correct state [5]. While the
algorithm by Dubois et al. offers provable attack resistance,
it considers a computationally unbounded attacker. Protecting
against such a strong adversary disregards mechanisms such as
digital signatures that can help to further decrease the number
of affected nodes.
In the context of distance vector routing, which implicitly
relies on BFS trees, Zapata and Asokan [23] proposed a
protocol that utilizes hash chains to keep malicious nodes from
lying about their distance from the root node. Furthermore,
their protocol employs cryptographic signatures to prevent
attacks on the mechanism for the detection of routing loops.
Subsequently, Hu et al. [9] proposed a protocol that uses
hash chains both against attacks on the reported distance
as well as against attacks on loop-detection, thus reducing
computational overhead compared to digital signatures. In
contrast to the work of Dubois et al., both approaches assume
a computationally bounded attacker. However, they do not
provide a formal proof of their security guarantees.
In summary, there exists no provably secure BFS tree
construction algorithm under the assumption of a computa-
tionally bounded attacker. We expect that such an algorithm
can provide protection to a larger set of nodes than the existing
information theoretically secure algorithms.
III. MODEL AND NOTATION
We now formalize route-restricted overlays as well as the
problem of computing a breadth-first-search tree in the context
of self-stabilization.
A. System model
We model a route-restricted overlay S = (V,E) as a finite set
V of n nodes and a set of bidirectional communication links
E ⊂ V×V . For each node u, the setN(u) = {v | {u, v} ∈ E}
denotes the neighbors of u.
We build upon the shared memory model where each pair
of nodes {u, v} ∈ E can communicate via shared registers
ruv and rvu, where u is only allowed to write into ruv and
read from rvu. We thus call ruv u’s output register and rvu
its input register.
Please note that we use the shared memory model solely to
simplify formal analysis, as it omits the modeling of message
transmission. We consider this to be reasonable, as we focus on
malicious node behavior and neither link failures nor delays.
For the computation of a BFS tree, every node u holds the
following elements:
• IDu, a fixed, globally unique ID from a set ID,
• levelu, a non-negative integer variable denoting u’s cur-
rent, assumed distance to the root,
• pIDu, a variable holding the ID of the node that is
currently considered parent, in other words, the neighbor
of u on the path to the root in the subgraph corresponding
to the tree.
Furthermore, each communication register holds two values
ID and level such that each output register of a node u
holds u’s ID as well as its current level-value. Each input
register rvu of a node u accordingly holds u’s current view
of v’s ID and level-value. In the following, we denote the
set Nmin(u) = {v ∈ N(u)|∀n ∈ N(u) : levelv ≤ leveln}
as minimal neighbors of u. Parent nodes are always minimal
neighbors in BFS spanning trees.
We refer to the values currently held by the level- and pID-
variable of a node u as well as the register contents, at one
point in time, as the state of u. The state of u is said to be
legitimate if it fulfills Def. 1.
Definition 1. (Legitimate state) Let S = (V,E) be a route-
restricted overlay with a distinguished root node l ∈ V with
ID-value IDL ∈ ID. The state of a node u whose minimal
neighbors have level lmin is called legitimate if it fulfills the
following conditions:
1) levelu = 0 iff IDu = IDL
2) levelu = lmin + 1 if IDu 6= IDL
3) pIDu = IDu iff IDu = IDL
4) ∃vmin ∈ Nmin(u) : pIDu = IDvmin if IDu 6= IDL
B. Adversary model
In this work, we consider adversaries who aim to perform
large-scale denial of service attacks. For payment networks,
they might be competing payment network operators who want
to attract more users by rendering other networks unusable.
For social overlays, the adversary might aim to weaken the
privacy [1] or degrade utility so that users move to communi-
cation services with weaker privacy protection.
Allowing multiple adversaries to act in concert strictly
increases their power. We hence assume a single, collective
adversary who controls a set B of malicious (or adversarial)
nodes and is able to set up a bounded number of connections
between these malicious and honest nodes H . The motivation
for these bounds is the difficulty of large-scale social engineer-
ing that will only be successful for a subset of participants.
During an attack, each malicious node may report incorrect
data to the adjacent honest nodes in order to keep them from
reaching or remaining in a legitimate state. Thus, malicious
nodes may set their output registers arbitrarily and report
different ID- and level-values to different neighbors.
However, we assume that the adversary does not know all
honest nodes and their internal connections a priori. Hence, he
cannot choose which nodes will be malicious or which nodes
will connect to malicious nodes. Given that social overlay
and payment networks are large-scale and dynamic distributed
systems with participants from a multitude of countries, we
consider this assumption to be realistic.
For all practical purposes, the Dolev-Yao model, which
assumes an adversary who is limited to polynomial-time
attacks – and hence unable to break secure cryptographic
primitives – has been accepted as realistic [4]. Hence, we
aim for algorithms that protect against adversaries that are
polynomially bounded.
C. Formalization of resilience and performance
We formalize the attack resistance of a spanning tree
construction protocol via the concept of topology-aware (TA)
strict stabilization [5]. To do so, we express the state of every
node in the overlay at one point in time as a configuration γ.
Following the idea of self-stabilization, we consider that
every node starts in an arbitrary state. Thus, nodes may change
their state over time to reach a legitimate state. The sequence
of configurations γ0, γ1, . . . is called a computation Γ . The
transition from γt to γt+1 is called a step and corresponds to
at least one node processing the data in its input register and
writing corresponding data into its output register.
Note that self-stabilizing algorithms never terminate but
repeatedly update their state and communication registers.
However, a node executing a step may not actually change
the values of its variables or output registers (e.g., because its
current state is legitimate).
a) Network dynamics: Route-restricted overlays are dy-
namic: nodes may join and leave the system, connections
between nodes are established or torn down over time. An
overlay S = (V,E) changes into an overlay S′ = (V ′, E′)
with a potentially different network size as a consequence
of such events. According to literature, we call such changes
churn events. To account for the fact that computations are
defined for a fixed system S, a churn event interrupts a
computation on S and starts a new computation on S′.
At the beginning of the new computation, all nodes in V ∩V ′
have the same state as at the end of the computation on S,
reflecting the fact that they cannot detect the change until they
read from their registers. The remaining nodes in V ′ may
start in an arbitrary initial state. In route-restricted networks,
the initial state includes information about the register of
neighbors, which the new node will eventually write to.
b) Containment of attacks: TA strict stabilization for a
set SB ⊂ H of honest nodes denotes that every honest node u
except those in the set SB eventually reaches and remains in
a legitimate state. We call the set SB the containment area of
S, because SB (also called lost nodes) represents the part of
the network where the adversary can keep the state of nodes
from converging, whereas all nodes outside of SB (called safe
nodes) will eventually reach and remain in a legitimate state.
We now formalize the concept of a node having only honest
ancestors on its path to the root.
Definition 2. (Root-directed path) Given a route-restricted
overlay S and a configuration γ, the root-directed path Pu
of a node u is a finite sequence v1, v2, . . . , vn+1 of nodes in
a legitimate state such that vn+1 = u and pIDvi+1 = IDvi
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and either pIDv1 = IDv1 (the legitimate
root) or v1 is a malicious node. We call u ill-directed if vi is
malicious for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and well-directed otherwise.
As long as a node is ill-directed, it is subject to changes
in the level-value reported by the adversarial node on its
root-directed path. Thus, it is not guaranteed to remain in a
legitimate state. However, an ill-directed node is not inherently
a lost node, because it might eventually become well-directed
as the execution proceeds.
We express the situation that a node’s state has converged
and remains unaffected by attacks as follows:
Definition 3. (Stable state) The state of a node u is said to
be stable if it is legitimate and u never changes its levelu-
and pIDu-variable as long as no churn event occurs. In
particular, actions performed by malicious nodes do not affect
u. A configuration γ is called SB-stable if the state of every
node in V \ SB is stable.
We define a SB-topology-aware-strictly-stabilizing (SB-TA-
strictly-stabilizing) algorithm as follows:
Definition 4. (SB-TA-strictly-stabilizing algorithm) A dis-
tributed algorithm A is SB-TA-strictly-stabilizing if and only
if starting from an arbitrary configuration, every execution
contains a SB-stable configuration.
c) Time complexity: To be able to reason about the time
complexity that a distributed algorithm requires to reach a le-
gitimate state, we use the concept of asynchronous rounds. The
first asynchronous round of a computation Γ is the shortest
prefix Γ ′ of Γ such that each node has read from and wrote
to all of its registers at least once. The second asynchronous
round then is the first asynchronous round of the computation
following Γ ′ and so on. In other words, the length of an
asynchronous round corresponds to the maximum amount of
time needed for the slowest node (regarding computational
speed) to process its inputs and write the corresponding
outputs.
IV. SIGNATURE-BASED COMPUTATION OF BFS TREES
The state-of-the-art algorithm for the construction of BFS trees
proposed by Dubois et al. [5] ensures that all honest nodes
whose distance from the closest malicious node is higher or
equal than their distance from the root will eventually reach
a stable state. As the set of nodes that do not reach a stable
state is often quite large for this algorithm, we investigate
algorithms that achieve a higher number of stable nodes. In
contract to previous work, we assume our adversary to be
computationally bounded.
In our design, each node u holds a public/private key pair
pu, su of an asymmetric cryptosystem. The public key pu of
each node u is stored in the ID-register and the secret su is
stored in a new register called secretu. The given leader ID
IDL then is the public key of the corresponding root node,
implicitly choosing it as leader. Nodes do not require global
knowledge of all other nodes’ keys.
a) Assumptions: Four assumptions underlie our design:
• There is an honest root node whose key is known to all
nodes (e.g., bank in a payment network [11]).
• The clocks of any pair of nodes differ at most by a
globally known constant ∆C .
• The time needed for one iteration of each node’s main
loop is bounded by a globally known constant ∆E .
• The delay needed until a value written into an output
register is available in the corresponding input register is
bounded by a globally known constant ∆D.
The first assumption is in accordance with the existing liter-
ature on tree-based routing in route-restricted overlays [11],
[15], [16]. The remaining assumptions allow us to compute
expiration times for the data contained in the input register
of each node, thus keeping malicious nodes from reporting
outdated values obtained in previous computations.
b) Level attestation: To keep malicious nodes from ly-
ing about their distance to the root, we add a levelAtt-
variable to each node u, which holds a finite sequence P =
(p1, t1, sig1), (p2, t2, sig2), . . . , (pn, tn, sign) of tuples called
a level attestation. The elements pi, ti, and sigi denote a public
key, a timestamp, and a cryptographic signature, respectively.
We say that such a sequence is valid for node u at time t if
the following conditions are satisfied:
1) p1 = IDL,
2) ∀i ∈ {1, .., n} : t− ti ≤ ∆C + (∆D +∆E)(n− i+ 1),
3) ∀i ∈ {1, .., n− 1} : sigi is a signature over pi+1||ti that
is valid for pi,
4) sign holds a signature over IDu||tn that is valid for pn,
where a||b denotes the concatenation of a and b.
Condition (1) ensures that the first tuple of the attestation
has indeed been generated by the root node. Condition (2)
ensures that adversarial nodes cannot use obsolete attestations
(e.g., from an earlier computation) forever. Condition (3) and
(4) ensure that the signatures are computed correctly.
c) Link signatures: Additional to the level attestation,
each node assigns a randomly chosen neighbor ID nIDv
to each neighbor v once in the beginning of the algorithm.
During the computation, every honest node tells each neighbor
its respective neighbor ID. Whenever a neighbor of a node
u transmits a new level attestation, it also has to send a
corresponding neighbor signature that includes its neighbor
ID assigned by u. Given a valid level attestation P with the
last element (p, t, sig) and a cryptographic hash function h, a
neighbor signature s is valid for node u and neighbor v if s
is a valid signature over nIDv||h(P ) for p. This addendum
keeps malicious nodes from sending a shortened version of an
attestation received by an honest neighbor.
d) Adaptive neighbor preference: To ensure stabilization
in the case that a node has multiple neighbors that are minimal
according to Def. 1, each node u assigns a unique number
between 0 and |N(u)| − 1 to each neighbor and chooses
the minimal neighbor with the lowest number as parent. The
number of the current parent is kept in a variable prnt. As
the preferred neighbor may be ill-directed, the algorithm of
Dubois et al. [5] adaptively changes which neighbor will be
preferred whenever a node changes its parent. We implemented
this strategy as follows: We add an offset counter istart ∈
{0, .., |N(u)| − 1} such that u traverses its neighbors from
istart to (|N(u)|−1)+ istart mod |N(u)|. Whenever a node
u changes its parent from the neighbor with number prnt to
a neighbor with a number prnt′ that, counting from istart
with wraparound, comes after prnt, then u will set istart to
prnt′, thus favoring prnt′ over prnt in the future. To compare
nodes’ positions a and b with regard to istart, we say that
a ≺istart b if either i) istart ≤ a < b, ii) b < istart ≤ a or
iii) a < b < istart. Informally, a ≺istart b indicates that b be
will be reached later than a when counting from istart modulo
|N(u)|.
e) Spanning Tree Algorithm: Algorithm 1 displays the
pseudocode for our spanning tree construction algorithm: Each
output register of every node u holds 5 elements, namely
Algorithm 1: Attestation-based spanning tree on node u
1 while true do
2 foreach i in N(u) do
3 lriu := read(riu)
4 ts := getCurrentTime()
5 istart := istart mod |N(u)|
6 if ID = IDL then
7 pID := ID
8 level := 0
9 levelAtt := nil
10 else
11 parentFound := false
12 Nvalid := {i ∈ N(u) |
isValidAtt(lriu .levelAtt , lriu .level + 1 ) ∧
isValidLink(lriu .levelAtt , lriu .sigadj )}
13 level := min{lriu.level | i ∈ Nvalid}+ 1
14 foreach i in 1..|N(u)| do
15 j := i+ istart mod |N(u)|
16 if not parentFound and N(j) ∈ Nvalid and
level = lrju.level + 1 then
17 if prnt ≺istart j then
18 istart := j
19 prnt := j
20 pID := lrju.ID
21 levelAtt := lrju.levelAtt
22 parentFound := true
23 foreach i in N(u) do
24 siglvl := sign(lriu.ID||ts)
25 exAtt := append(levelAtt, (ID, ts, siglvl))
26 sigadj := sign(lriu.nID||h(exAtt))
27 write(rui) := (ID, level, exAtt,nIDi, sigadj)
the ID- and level-value of u as well as the levelAtt- and
nID-value together with the neighbor signature sigadj for the
corresponding neighbor. The algorithm leverages the following
cryptographic functions: The sign-function uses the key stored
in the secret-register to compute a signature sig. The function
h is a cryptographic hash function.
Every node periodically reads the content of each input reg-
ister, processes the content, and writes corresponding outputs
to output registers. The leader node first ensures that its pID-
and level-value are set correctly (Line 7–8). Subsequently, it
generates a level attestation for each neighbor and writes its
own ID and level-value together with the respective nID-
value, level attestation, and neighbor signature into the corre-
sponding output register (Line 24–27). Because the levelAtt-
variable is set to nil, the append -operation in Line 25 just
returns its second argument.
During the processing stage (Line 11–22), an honest non-
leader node recomputes its current pID-, prnt-, level- and
levelAtt-value. It first checks the validity of the received level
attestations and neighbor signatures and computes the set of
valid neighbors in Line 12. The isV alidAtt-function checks
whether a given level attestation is valid, as defined above. If
the given level attestation is valid, isV alidAtt further checks
whether the length of the attestation equals the given level
value and returns false in case of a mismatch. Given this check
succeeds, the isV alidLink-function checks if a given sigadj-
value is valid for the corresponding neighbor. If a parent node
with a valid level attestation has been chosen, the node first
checks if its previous parent became either non-minimal or
its attestation became invalid and if so, sets istart to j. It is
possible that prnt might hold a value larger than |N(u)| − 1
(e.g. because its former parent had this number and left the
overlay). prnt will then be set to j that holds a value from
the range {0, .., |N(u)| − 1} (Line 15). Afterwards, it sets its
prnt-, pID- and levelAtt-value accordingly. Finally, the node
computes the corresponding level attestation for each neighbor
and writes it into the respective output register (Line 24–27).
V. ANALYSIS
We prove that, given an honest root node r, Algorithm 1 is
S′B-TA-strictly-stabilizing with
S′B = {u ∈ H | ∃b ∈ B : d
B
min + dS(b, u)− 1 ≤ dS(r, u)}
(1)
where dBmin = minb∈B dS(r, b). The “-1” stems from the
fact that a malicious node can copy the outputs of an honest
neighbor into its output registers (hence pretending to be
its own predecessor), thus avoiding the need to append an
attestation tuple and hence increase its maximum level.
Furthermore, let dHS (u, v) denote the length of the shortest
path between u and v in S that does not contain a malicious
node. If no such path exists, we set dHS (u, v) = ∞. If
malicious nodes repeatedly change their outputs in order to de-
stabilize honest nodes, we show that our algorithm guarantees
that all nodes in the set
S′L = {u ∈ H | ∃b ∈ B : d
B
min + dS(b, u)− 1 < d
H
S (r, u)}
(2)
eventually reach a stable state. Informally, we show that S′L ⊂
S′B is the containment area for an adversary that focuses on
disrupting convergence by changing its behavior. However, for
an arbitrary adversary aiming to maximize the fraction of ill-
directed nodes, we achieve only a smaller containment area of
S′B .
Since the system starts in an arbitrary state, a malicious
node may initially hold a level attestation that is valid but for
which no corresponding path in the overlay exists. We hence
say that a level attestation (p1, t1, sig1), . . . , (pn, tn, sign) is
consistent for node u if it is invalid or if there exists a path
v1, . . . , vn in the system such that (1) pi is the public key of vi
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and (2) u either is a neighbor of vn or both
u and vn are neighbors of a malicious node b. Otherwise, we
say that the attestation is inconsistent. A configuration is called
consistent if the levelAtt-values as well as the in- and output-
registers of all nodes only contain consistent level attestations.
In the following, we assume that at the beginning of a
computation at time t, all timestamps of every inconsistent
attestation are at most t + ∆C . We consider this to be
reasonable since t + ∆C is the highest value that a honest
node (including the root) may use as timestamp and thus a
malicious node cannot have a valid attestation with a higher
timestamp from a previous computation. As a consequence,
every inconsistent attestation of length n becomes invalid after
at most ∆C + (∆D + ∆E)n time units. So, every route-
restricted overlay S with diameter diam(S) reaches a con-
sistent configuration after at most ∆C +(∆D +∆E)diam(S)
time units.
A. Proof of S′B-TA-strict stabilization
We start the actual proof by establishing key properties of
level attestation to later leverage in the proof. In a nutshell,
malicious nodes can only influence keys that are used after
the dBmin-th element of a valid and consistent level attestation
P but before the |P | − dBu,min-th element with d
B
u,min =
minb∈B{dS(u, b)}. Based on this result, we can then show
that a node is well-directed if their levelAtt-value is of length
less than dBmin + d
B
u,min − 1. Convergence to a stable state
for all nodes in S′B follows from the fact that the system at
some point reaches a state when these nodes have a valid and
consistent levelAtt-value with minimal levels and hence will
not change parents anymore.
Lemma 1. Let P = (p1, t1, sig1), . . . , (pn, tn, sign) be a level
attestation. Consider a node u such that sign is a signature
over IDu||tn. At time t, we have t− ti ≤ ∆C +(∆D +∆E) ·
(n− i+1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and the computation has started
at least ∆C + (∆D +∆E) · n time units before, so that P is
consistent for u. If P is valid, then the following two statements
hold:
1) For j ≤ dBmin, pj is the public key of an honest node v
and dS(v, r) < j.
2) For j > n−dBmin,u+1, pj is the public key of an honest
node v and dS(v, u) ≤ n− j + 1.
Proof. We show the first claim by induction on j. As p1
always needs to be the public key of the leader and the
leader is honest by assumption, the claim holds for j = 1.
Let 1 < j ≤ dBmin and assume the claim holds for j − 1.
Then sigj−1 is a signature over pj ||tj−1 using the secret
key sj−1 associated with pj−1. By induction hypothesis,
pj−1 is the public key of an honest node w with distance
dS(w, r) < j − 1 ≤ d
B
min − 1. dS(w, r) < d
B
min − 1 implies
that w has only honest neighbors, which only write their own
keys to its output register for w to sign.
Furthermore, because w itself is honest, w only signs keys
and timestamps that it reads from its input registers. Thus,
for pj ||tj−1 to be signed by w, pj needs to be the key of
an honest neighbor v of w. Given that w’s distance to the
root is less than j − 1 by induction hypothesis, we also have
dS(v, r) ≤ dS(w, r) + 1 < j. This proves the first claim.
Similarly, we show the second claim by induction on j′ =
n− j + 1. Note that if dBmin,u = 1, i.e., u is the neighbor of
a malicious node, then there is nothing to show as there is no
pj such that j > n− d
B
min,u + 1. So, we assume d
B
min,u > 1.
For j′ = 1, we only have to consider the key pn. As u is
honest, it only writes its own key into output registers to be
signed by neighbors. If dBmin,u > 1, all of u’s neighbors are
honest. They would hence only sign u’s key concatenated with
a timestamp with their own, meaning that any node v with
public key pn is indeed an honest node and dS(v, u) = 1.
Consider 1 < j′ < dBmin,u and assume the claim holds for
j′ − 1. Hence, pn−(j′−1)+1 is the public key of an honest
node w with dS(w, u) ≤ j
′− 1. w writes its public key and a
timestamp to the registers that will be read by its neighbors. As
j′− 1 < dBmin,u − 1, these neighbors are honest and will sign
the key and timestamp with their own keys. Hence, any public
key pn−j′+1 whose corresponding secret key has been used
to sign pn−(j′−1)+1||tn−(j′−1) belongs to an honest neighbor
v of w with dS(v, u) ≤ dS(w, u) + 1 = j
′. So, the second
claim follows by induction as well.
Lemma 2. Let the computation have started a least ∆C +
(∆D +∆E) · n time units before and u ∈ V \ S
′
B be a node
with a valid levelAtt-value of length n < dBmin + d
B
u,min− 1.
Then u is well-directed.
Proof. Because ∆C +(∆D +∆E) ·n time units have passed,
the levelAtt-value of u is also consistent. By Lemma 1, the
first dBmin public keys have to belong to honest nodes and the
last dBu,min − 1 keys have to belong to honest nodes as well.
Hence, if n < dBmin + d
B
u,min − 1, all keys pj have to belong
to an honest node vj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Set vn+1 = u.
u can only be ill-directed if at least one vj has their pID-
value set to a key provided by a malicious node. First, consider
the case that j < dBmin. By Lemma 1, dS(vj , r) < d
B
min − 1,
meaning that vj only has honest neighbors. Honest nodes only
write their own keys in the register of their neighbors, so that
vj can hence only set its pID-value to one of their keys. Now,
consider j > dBmin, i.e., n−j+1 < n−d
B
min+1 ≤ d
B
u,min−1.
According to Lemma 1, dS(vj , u) ≤ n− j + 1 < d
B
u,min − 1.
Again, vj has only honest neighbors and can hence only set
its pID-value to one of their keys.
It remains to consider the case j = dBmin. By the first part
of the proof, vj is the only node that can have malicious
neighbors. Assume that vj has set its pID to a malicious
neighbor b. For u’s levelAtt to correspond to a valid attes-
tation, vj−1 has to sign pj ||tj−1 resulting in sigj−1, append
(pj−1, tj−1, sigj−1) to the attestation, and write the attestation
to the register corresponding to the neighbor that wrote pj
to the register. Because vj−1 has only honest neighbors, the
respective neighbor has to be vj , the only honest node that
would claim pj as its key. So, for u’s levelAtt-value to
include (pj−1, tj−1, sigj−1), vj must have read the register
and disseminated (pj−1, tj−1, sigj−1) as part of a level at-
testation. Consequently, vj is aware that vj−1 offers a root-
directed path of supposed length j − 2 ≤ dBmin − 2. For
vj to choose a different parent, b has to produce a valid
attestation P˜ = (p˜1, t˜1, s˜ig1), . . . , (p˜l, t˜l, s˜igl) with l ≤ j − 1
and s˜igl being a signature over IDvj ||t˜l. Furthermore, b has
to ensure that the isV alidLink-function returns true. The
neighbor-related signature has to be signed by the secret key
s˜l corresponding to p˜l. As b can not forge signatures, P˜ has
to be a (potentially shortened) attestation that b has read from
one of its input registers. For such an attestation, p˜l belongs
to an honest node w at distance at most l − 1 from the root
by Lemma 1. Due to dHS (w, r) ≤ l− 1 < d
B
min− 1, w has no
malicious neighbors. By Algorithm 1, w only writes signatures
over nIDw||h(L) for some L to registers of neighbors. Being
honest, these neighbors do not disseminate the respective
signatures. As a consequence, b can not obtain the required
neighbor signature and hence vj does not accept any attestation
from b as its levelAtt-value.
In summary, none of the nodes vj has its pID-value set to
a key provided by a malicious node and hence u is indeed
well-directed.
Theorem 1. Given any route-restricted overlay S with diam-
eter diam(S), a computation of Algorithm 1 starting from
an arbitrary configuration reaches a consistent configuration
after at most ∆C +(∆D+∆E) ·diam(S) time units. Further-
more the computation will reach a S′B-stable configuration γ
∗
within at most diam(S) + 1 additional asynchronous rounds.
Thus, Algorithm 1 is S′B-TA-strictly-stabilizing.
Proof. Arrival at a consistent configuration follows from the
assumption that the timestamps of every inconsistent level
attestation do not exceed the starting time of the computation
by more than ∆C time units, as explained at the beginning of
this section. To prove the subsequent convergence to a S′B-
stable configuration, we first show that after l+ 1 rounds, all
nodes u ∈ V \S′B within distance l of the root are well-directed
and have valid levelAtt-values of length l. The properties from
Definition 1 follow. Last, we show that these nodes remain
well-directed.
After the first round, the root has written its information to
all registers. After the second round, the neighbors of the root
have processed these registers. Hence, each such neighbor u
will set its levelAtt-value to a valid attestation of length 1. If
u ∈ V \S′B , the distance dS(u, b) ≥ 2 for any malicious node
b and hence by Lemma 2, u is well-directed. So, the claim
holds for l = 1.
Assume the claim holds for l, i.e., after l + 1 rounds, all
nodes v ∈ V \ S′B within distance l of the root are well-
directed and have valid levelAtt-values of l. They know the
IDs their neighbors have assigned to them as l > 1 indicates
that they have read it from the register at least once. As a
consequence, they can construct a valid attestation of length
l + 1 for each neighbor w as well as the necessary signature
over the neighbor ID nIDw. They write this information to
the register rvw . After l + 1 rounds, any node u ∈ V \ S
′
B at
distance l+1 from the root has read the register corresponding
to its neighbors at distance l to the root. As a consequence,
u’s levelAtt-value is of length l+1. As u ∈ V \S′B , Lemma 2
shows that u is well-directed. It follows by induction that
within diam(S) rounds, all nodes u ∈ V \ S′B are well-
directed.
It remains to prove that the nodes in V \ S′B remain well-
directed. To become ill-directed, a node has to change its
pID-value. Let u be the first node to change its pID-value.
According to Algorithm 1, u selects the parent from those
neighbors that provide the shortest valid attestation and a valid
neighbor signature. By assumption, u breaks ties consistently,
meaning u only changes its parent if either i) u’s previous
parent does not provide any valid attestation of the shortest
length or provides an invalid neighbor signature, or ii) a
neighbor that is not the current parent writes an attestation
of a shorter length than u’s levelAtt-value to its register and
the content of the register passes the two validity checks.
In order to conclude that neither i) or ii) are possible,
consider the following: Let v be u’s parent and note that
v ∈ V \S′B by the definition of S
′
B as dS(v, r) = dS(u, r)−1
and dS(v, b) ≥ dS(u, b)−1 for all malicious nodes b. It follows
recursively that all nodes on a root-directed path of u are in
V \ S′B . Case i) would imply that a node on the root-directed
path changed its parent, as honest nodes do not write invalid
attestations or neighbor signatures to registers. However, such
a parent change contradicts the definition of u as the first node
in V \S′B to change its parent. If case ii) holds, by Lemma 1,
u has to be well-directed after its parent change. Hence, its
new parent w is an honest node. By the above, w and all
nodes on the new root-directed path are in V \S′B and at least
one of them has to have changed its parent for w to write
an attestation of a different length. Again, such a change in
parent is a contradiction to the definition of u. Consequently,
nodes u ∈ V \ S′B do not change their pID-value for the rest
of the computation and remain well-directed.
B. Proof of stabilization for S′L under attacks
Building upon Theorem 1, we now show that under an
attacker that frequently changes the output values of its nodes,
all nodes u with dBmin − d
H
S (b, u) − 1 = d
H
S (r, u) eventually
reach a stable state as well. Our result requires the concept
of a SB-disturbance, a concept similar to Dubois et al. [5]’s
SB-disruption.
Definition 5. (SB-disturbance) Two consecutive configura-
tions γ0 and γ1 are a SB-disturbance if at least one node
u ∈ V \ SB changes its levelu- or pID-variable.
In contrast to a SB-disruption, a SB-disturbance does not
assume that all nodes in V \ SB have a legitimate state.
Theorem 2. Given any route-restricted overlay S with di-
ameter diam(S) and degsum =
∑
u∈S′
B
\S′
L
|N(u)|, a com-
putation of Algorithm 1 starting from an arbitrary con-
figuration reaches a S′B-stable configuration γ
+ within at
most ∆C + (∆D + ∆E) · diam(S) time units plus at most
diam(S)+ 1 asynchronous rounds. After reaching the config-
uration γ+, S will reach a S′L-stable configuration within at
most (2degsum − |S
′
B \ S
′
L|) S
′
L-disturbances.
Proof. The S′B-stability after ∆C + (∆D + ∆E) · diam(S)
time units plus diam(S) + 1 asynchronous rounds follows
from Theorem1. In order to have S′L-stability, all nodes in
S′B \ S
′
L have to reach a stable and legitimate state.
Let u ∈ S′B \ S
′
L. The proof consists of showing the
following four claims:
1) u’s level-value is levelu = d
H
S (u, r) for any configura-
tion after γ+.
2) If u has a parent v such that v is a node on a path from u
to the root of length dHS (u, r) consisting of only honest
nodes, then v ∈ V \ S′L and u will not change its pID-
value in any subsequent configuration if prnt = istart.
3) u will choose such a node v as a parent after at most
(2|N(u)| − 1) S′L-disturbances that affect u, i.e., in
which u changes its level or parent.
4) The maximal number of S′L-disturbances until u is in a
stable and legitimate state is 2degsum − |S
′
B \ S
′
L|.
By definition of S′B and S
′
L, u has at least one path con-
sisting of only honest nodes to the root r. Furthermore,
as dBu,min + d
B
min − 1 = d
H
S (u, r), u never receives a
valid level attestation of length less than dHS (u, r). So, we
claim that after diam(S) + 1 asynchronous rounds, u has to
have level dHS (u, r). The previous claim obviously holds for
dHS (u, r) = 1 and by induction holds for all d
H
S (u, r) as any
honest neighbor v of u with dHS (v, r) = d
H
S (u, r) − 1 sends
a valid level attestation to u. Hence, u’s level-value does not
change and the first claim holds.
For the second claim, consider Algorithm 1. u always
selects the minimal neighbor whose unique index is reached
first. If prnt = istart, u first considers its current parent, which
is v (Line 15). u only replaces v if it does not receive a valid
attestation of length dHS (v, r) and link signature from v. As v is
honest, it does not send invalid attestations or link signatures.
So, a change would only happen if v changes its level-value.
We now show that v does not change its level-value and hence
u does not change its pID-value. If v ∈ V \ S′B , v is in a
stable state and hence does not change its level-value. By the
first part of the proof, v ∈ S′B \ S
′
L also does not change its
level-value. So, it remains to show that v /∈ S′L. By definition,
v has a path to r consisting of only honest nodes and being of
length dHS (v, r) = d
H
S (u, r)− 1. Similarly, as v is a neighbor
of u, we have dBv,min ≥ d
B
u,min − 1, i.e., v is at most 1 hop
closer to any malicious node than u. So, dBv,min+d
B
min− 1 ≥
dBu,min + d
B
min − 1 − 1 ≥ d
H
S (u, r) − 1 = d
H
S (v, r). The
third step follows from Eq. 2 because u ∈ V \ S′L. So,
dBv,min + d
B
min − 1 ≥ d
H
S (v, r) and hence again by Eq. 2,
v /∈ S′L. So, indeed, u does not change its pID-value.
The third claim ascertains that u chooses such a v as parent
after at most (2|N(u)| − 1) S′L-disturbances affecting u. By
the above, a S′L-disturbance can only affect u’s pID-value.
We determine an upper bound on the number of times the
pID-value can change until istart = prnt and v is the parent
node. Let l be the local index of v assigned by u and
h(m, i) =
{
m− i if m ≥ i
m− i+ |N(u)| if m < i
As the result of a S′L-disturbance, u’s parent changes to
either v or a node with pointer prnt′ 6= prnt with
h(prnt′, istart) < h(l, istart). If it changes to prnt
′, we either
have h(prnt′, istart) < h(prnt, istart) or h(prnt
′, istart) >
h(prnt, istart). In this first case, istart remains the same
(Line 17). However, the maximal number of consecutive
decreases of the function h(prnt, istart) is h(l, istart) − 1 ≤
|N(u)| − 1. Once istart = prnt, h(prnt, istart) = 0.
Any further change corresponds to the second case, as the
Table I
STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES OF GRAPHS USED FOR SIMULATION,WITH AVG.
SHORTEST PATH LENGTH (CPL) AND CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT (CC).
Graph # nodes # edges CPL CC
Facebook 63,392 816,886 4.32 0.253
Ripple 67,149 99,787 3.82 0.154
Randomized Facebook
63,392
816,886 3.58 0.005
Erdös-Renyi 824,096 3.74 < 0.001
condition in Line 17 will hold for any new parent and
so h(p, istart) continues to be 0. In the second case, i.e.,
h(prnt′, istart) > h(prnt, istart), istart is now set to p
′, i.e.,
h(l, istart) decreases. h(l, istart) can decrease at most |N(u)|
times. So, the total number of S′L-disturbances until u chooses
v as a parent are the sum of possible instance of the first and
the second case, namely |N(u)| − 1+ |N(u)| = 2|N(u)| − 1.
Furthermore, istart = prnt holds after these disturbances.
The fourth and last claim establishes that all nodes in V \S′L
are in a legitimate and stable state after at most 2degsum −
|S′B \S
′
L| disturbances. First note that each S
′
L-disturbance has
to affect a node in S′B \S
′
L. This is a direct consequence of the
definition of S′L-disturbance and the fact that S is S
′
B-stable.
A S′L-disturbance requires a node in V \S
′
L to change its level
or parent but nodes in V \ S′B are in a stable state already,
so the affected node has to be in (V \ S′L) ∩ S
′
B = S
′
B \ S
′
L.
Combining the second and third claim, nodes u ∈ S′B \S
′
L are
affected at most 2|N(u)|−1 times by a S′L-disturbance. So, the
total number of S′L-disturbances until no node in V \ S
′
L can
be affected anymore is
∑
u∈S′
B
\S′
L
(2|N(u)|−1) = 2degsum−
|S′B \S
′
L|. It remains to show that all these nodes are indeed in
legitimate states. By the second and third claim, all nodes in
S′B \S
′
L have an honest parent in V \S
′
L. In addition, all nodes
in V \S′B have an honest parent in V \S
′
L because of the S
′
B-
stability. Hence, a node u ∈ S′B \ S
′
L cannot have an ancestor
in B∪S′L and is hence well-directed and in a legitimate state.
Furthermore, u is in a stable state by the second claim.
VI. EVALUATION
Using OMNeT++ [20], we implemented a simulation to
evaluate the impact of our attestation-based algorithm on
the number of lost nodes compared to the non-cryptographic
state-of-the-art. Furthermore, we investigated the impact of
the network structure, the position of the root node, and the
placement of edges between honest and malicious nodes.
A. Metrics, Data Sets, and System Parameters
Given a distributed system S = (V,E) with a subsetH of hon-
est nodes and a SB-TA stabilizing spanning tree construction
algorithm, we measured the ratio of lost nodes (RLN) |SB |/|H|.
A low ratio of lost nodes indicates high attack resistance.
Route-restricted overlays include both social overlays and
payment networks. We hence utilized a real-world graph
for each of them and compare the results with synthetic
graphs for the purpose of characterizing the impact of various
topological features. Facebook denotes a real-world graph of
Facebook [22], as used in several prior studies [12], [15].
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Figure 1. Observed mean ratio of lost nodes over 100 runs per configuration for 25, 200, 1000, and 5000 attack edges under the first adversarial behavior.
The bars above and below each point represent 99% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2. Observed mean ratio of lost nodes over 100 runs per configuration for 25, 200, 1000, and 5000 attack edges under the second adversarial behavior.
The bars above and below each point represent 99% confidence intervals.
Ripple denotes a real-world graph from the Ripple payment
network [16]. Ripple has a low number of edges and a heavily
skewed degree distribution: 95% of all nodes have a degree
less or equal than the average degree of approximately 3.
Our synthetic data sets are i) a random synthetic network
(denoted randomized Facebook) with the same degree dis-
tribution as the Facebook graph and ii) an Erdös and Renyi
graph (ER) with approximately the same number of nodes
and edges as Facebook but normal distributed degrees [7]. We
compare Facebook with randomized Facebook to characterize
the impact of clustering while the comparison of randomized
Facebook and ER reveals the impact of the degree distribution.
We considered the number of malicious nodes and the time
of their presence to be unbounded but limit the total number
g of connections between honest nodes and malicious nodes.
To model that all nodes are colluding, we represented them as
a single node with g edges.
B. Set-up
We investigated the resistance of spanning tree algorithms
to adversarial behavior given structural differences of the
networks and a varying number g of attack edges. For all
scenarios, we performed 100 runs to obtain statistically sig-
nificant results.
We assumed the adversary knows all nodes but can only
establish a connection to a subset with limited size. Follow-
ing [2] we also assumed that users with many contacts are
more likely to accept new requests and thus connect with
a malicious node. We hence added a single adversary m to
the graph and choose the g honest neighbors at random, with
a probability proportional to their degree. Afterwards, a root
node r was chosen uniformly at random from all honest nodes
and the leader ID of each honest node was set accordingly.
We executed different spanning tree constructions for var-
ious adversarial behaviors. The two spanning tree algorithms
are Algorithm 1, i.e., spanning tree construction with level
attestation, and the state-of-the-art protocol by Dubois et
al. [5]. The two adversarial behaviors are:
1) The attacker aims to prevent convergence by causing
disturbances. By Theorem 2, the set of lost nodes
corresponds to S′L as defined in Eq. 2. Similarly, the
set of lost nodes for the state-of-the-art protocol is
SL = {u ∈ H : dS(u,m) < dS(u, r)} [5].
2) The attacker aims to maximize the number of ill-directed
nodes. In this case, the adversary always pretends to be
as close to the root as possible and does not perform
any disturbances. In this case, the set of lost nodes is
S′B as defined in Eq. 1 according to Theorem 1. For the
state-of-the-art protocol, the set of lost nodes is SB =
{u ∈ H : dS(u,m) < dS(u, r)}.
To investigate how strongly the cheating by one level (de-
scribed in Sec. V) affects the number of lost nodes when
Algorithm 1 is used, we furthermore simulated a modified
adversary which does not cheat, effectively following Algo-
rithm 1 correctly.
C. Impact of Level Attestation
Figure 1 show the obtained mean RLN with 99% confidence
intervals for the four graphs and both algorithms under the
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Figure 3. Obtained RLN values for the state-of-the-art protocol together with the average shortest path length to the root node and average shortest path
length to the adversary node of the respective simulation run with 25 attack edges. The runs are ordered according to the RLN value in ascending order.
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Figure 4. Results for the simulation runs of Algorithm 1 and 1000 attack edges. The effective average distance to m denotes the term d(m) + d(m, r)− 1.
The runs are ordered according to the RLN value in ascending order.
first adversarial behavior. Figure 2 shows the corresponding
data under the second adversarial behavior. Especially for the
Facebook graph, its randomized version, and the ER graph,
Algorithm 1 considerably reduced the ratio of lost nodes com-
pared to the state-of-the-art protocol. For the latter, an attack
with 25 edges resulted in a mean RLN of 0.57, 0.31, 0.19,
and 0.75 for the Facebook graph, the randomized Facebook
graph, the ER graph and the Ripple graph, respectively, under
the first adversarial behavior. Under the second adversarial
behavior, the mean RLN increased to 0.77, 0.66, 0.5 and
0.91 for the four graphs. When applying Algorithm 1, the
mean RLN at 25 attack edges under the first adversarial
behavior dropped down to 0.0005, 0.00006, 0.00005, and 0.34
for the Facebook graph, the randomized Facebook graph, the
ER graph, and the Ripple graph, respectively. Similarly, the
mean RLN at 25 attack edges under the second adversarial
behavior decreased to 0.002, 0.0006, 0.004 and 0.38 for the
four graphs. Even for 1000 attack edges, the mean RLN
for the Facebook graph, its randomized variant, and the ER
graph significantly decreased from 0.93, 0.84, and 0.84 to
0.18, 0.06, and 0.12, respectively under the first adversarial
behavior. Under the second adversarial behavior, the mean
RLN at 1000 attack edges was reduced from 0.98, 0.97, 0.98
and 0.95 to 0.36, 0.21 and 0.23 for the Facebook graphs and
the ER graph. In summary, while the exact numbers differ for
the two adversarial behaviors, the overall result is the same:
Algorithm 1 achieves a considerable higher number of well
directed nodes than the state of the art.
In the scenario with an adversary that does not cheat by a
level, the mean RLN was considerably lower than in the sce-
nario with Algorithm 1 alone, especially with 1000 and 5000
attack edges for both adversarial behaviors. Referring to Table
I we realize that all graphs used in our experiment have a very
low average path length, and all nodes are in short distance
from the root node. Increasing the adversary’s reported level
value by 1 then represents a significant disadvantage for the
attack. We conjecture that this causes many nodes to remain
well-directed and investigate this relationship in more detail
in the following.
For the Ripple graph, the improvement regarding mean
RLN was considerably lower than for the other graphs. In
the following, we describe the impact of distances between
honest nodes, malicious nodes, and the root node on the RLN
to explain this stark difference.
D. Impact of Network Structure
We start with a discussion of our results for the state-of-the-
art algorithm and subsequently present results for Algorithm 1.
Because the correlations between the different aspects were
similar for both adversarial behaviors, we focus on our results
for the first adversarial behavior.
a) State-of-the-Art Spanning Tree Construction: We con-
sidered the average hop distance over all honest nodes to
the root node d(r) and to the attacker node d(m) for each
simulation run. The lower d(r) is compared to d(m), the more
honest nodes will have a lower hop distance to r than to m
and thus be well-directed. Therefore, we expected a positive
correlation between d(r) − d(m) and the RLN.
Figure 3 shows the obtained RLN values in ascending order
together with the corresponding value of d(r) and d(m) for
25 attack edges and both adversarial behaviors. Indeed, the
difference d(r) − d(m) generally correlated with the RLN.
While d(m) only varied slightly between the different runs on
each graph, there are notable differences in the behavior of
d(r): It varied highly for the Facebook graphs and to some
extent for the Ripple graph but barely for the ER graph.
The reason for the small variance in d(r) for ER is due to
the uniform probability of two nodes being connected. As a
consequence, it was very unlikely that the average distance of
any node significantly differs from the other nodes. The degree
of m, corresponding to the 25 attack edges, was close to the
average degree of 26. However, the mean RLN was only 0.19,
because there was a high number of nodes whose distance
to the root node equalled that to the malicious node. These
nodes chose the path to the root node when the malicious
node continuously causes disturbances.
For the Facebook graphs and Ripple, there is a higher
variance of the root node degree and hence of the average
distance to the root. The distances in the randomized graph
were generally lower than in the original Facebook graph due
to its lower average path length. Furthermore, d(r) correlated
more strongly with the RLN, possibly due to the absence of
outlier nodes with increased shortest path length. Because of
the highly skewed degree distribution of the Ripple graph, the
random root node’s degree was 1 in 73 out of a 100 runs. The
degree of the adversarial node, i.e., 25, was hence generally
higher than the degree of the root, leading to shorter paths to
the malicious nodes and hence the observed high RLN.
b) Algorithm 1: In addition to d(r), we computed the
effective average hop distance D(m) = d(m) + d(m, r) − 1,
as d(m, r) − 1 is the level-value that m propagated during
a simulation run. We expected a positive correlation between
d(r)−D(m) and the RLN, i.e., nodes closer to the root node
than D(m) should be well-directed and otherwise not.
In all runs with 25 attack edges, D(m) was considerably
higher than d(r) such that only a very small number of nodes
became ill-directed. Figure 4 thus shows our more distinct
results for an adversary with 1000 attack edges, ordered by
the RLN. The results indeed validated the expected correlation.
Due to the high number of attack edges, the d(m) value of
each run only differed slightly from its mean value of 2.75,
2.52, 2.63, and 2.02 for the Facebook graph, the randomized
Facebook graph, the ER graph, and the Ripple graph, respec-
tively. Thus, the values of D(m) mainly depended on d(m, r)
and hence differed by integer values.
Again, the degree of correlation between d(r) − D(m)
and the RLN varied between graphs. The Facebook graph
generally had a longer average shortest path length and hence
varied in d(r) considerably. In contrast, the value of d(r) was
more stable for the randomized Facebook graph and the ER
graph, so that d(m, r) is indeed the main impact factor.
Here, we also find the explanation for the strong difference
between the mean RLN values for the simulations of Algo-
rithm 1 with a cheating adversary and those of Algorithm 1
with a non-cheating adversary on the Ripple graph. It stems
from the fact that the d(m, r) value decreased very slowly as
the number of attack edges increases. Concretely, the mean
value of d(r) was roughly 3.8, irrespective of the number of
attack edges and the construction algorithm. In the case of
25 attack edges, the mean value for D(m) was 3.9 and in
the case of 5000 edges, it was 2.9, such that the level value
propagated by m was low enough to cause a high number
of nodes to become ill-directed. As the value of D(m) was
increased by 1 when the adversary does not cheat, it was higher
than d(r) for any considered number of attack edges, resulting
in a negative d(r)−D(m)− 1 and hence a low impact of the
attack. In contrast, d(r) −D(m) was positive, corresponding
to an attack of high impact.
c) Summary of Results: The first part of our evaluation
showed that our protocol based on cryptographic signatures is
much more robust to malicious behavior and attacks than state-
of-the-art solutions without the usage of cryptography. Indeed,
as displayed in Figure 1, to compromise a similar number of
nodes, the adversary needs to establish up to 200 times as
many attack edges compared to the algorithm by Dubois et
al. [5].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we leveraged cryptographic signatures to
design a BFS tree algorithm that greatly reduces the number of
nodes affected by attacks. Based on the concept of topology-
aware strict stabilization, we proved that this algorithm only
allows malicious nodes to report a distance to the root that
differs by at most one from the correct value. Our evaluation
based on real-world scenarios demonstrates that this novel con-
struction provides crucial security improvements over existing,
non-cryptographic algorithms. Yet, our results indicate that the
resistance to attacks is highly correlated with the degree of
the root node, highlighting the need to develop secure leader
election algorithms that prioritize high-degree nodes.
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